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NOTE
An Introduction. to the Extraterritorial
Application of the American Antitrust Laws
The [Sherman Act) has a wider purpose fthan mere regulation of exor-
bitant profit). Indeed,,'even though, we disregard all but economic con-
siderations, it would by no means follow that such concentration of
producing power is to be desired, when it has not been used extortion-
ately. Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic
p wer deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to
industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counter-
act an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
Our antitrust laws apply to all American business operations abroad
which have a direct and substantial adverse effect upon our foreign com-
merce of the United States, and do not' apply to business operations
abroad that do not have such adverse competitive effect. Foreign com-
merce, of course, includes our imports and exports, as well as those ac-
tivities abroad. Celler,. A Congressman's View of the Sherman Act, 27
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 3, 7-8 (1965).
S INCE WORLD WAR II total private investment abroad has risen
from $14,883 million in 1945 *to $86,235 million in 1966.'
Much of the inrease relates to the expansion of Americarn.business
abroad in the form of silibidiaries and branches.' Coricui~r&fitly, ex-
traterritorial extension of the jurisdiction of antitrust laws has been
used to regulate the expansion. The purpose of this Note is to pro-
vide an introduction to the scope' of the extraterritorial application
of American antitrust laws and to explain the extent to which this
application conflicts with international law.
The scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction was delineated initially
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.2 This and subse-
quent cases gave rise to the Alcoa doctrine, whereby liability can at-
tach, even to nonnationals, if acts done outside the United States
produce consequences within it, a concept which has been the law
with respect to antitrust regulation abroad. The recent case of
Pacific Seafarers v. Pacific Far East Line' will be used in this Note
to draw comparisons with the Alcoa doctrine. Some possible solu-
1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 791
(1968).
2 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
3404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 872 (1969).
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tions will be suggested relative to the conflict of laws problem, and
discussion will be directed to a consideration of the extent to which
American courts apply antitrust laws abroad4 and how this applica-
tion conflicts with international law.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Sherman Antitrust Act ' was enacted in 1890 to protect
against harmful trusts and monopolies. Its economic purpose was
to develop a dynamic economy with a high standard of living. The
first significant antitrust case before the United States Supreme
Court which involved the question of extraterritorial application was
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,' in which the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, an American corporation, had induced
the Costa Rican government to confiscate the plaintiff's property.7
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, firmly articulated
the territorial principle of jurisdiction in holding that the Sherman
Act did not apply. Under this theory, an act achieves significance
only at the place of its occurrance' As Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done .... For another jurisdiction,
if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according
to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the
acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with
4 It appears that during the formulation of the Sherman Act there was little discus-
sion as to whether the Act applied to conduct abroad. However, Senator Sherman said:
It is true that if a crime is committed outside the United States, it cannot be
punished in the United States. But if an unlawful combination is made out-
side the United States and in pursuance of it property is brought into the
United States, such property is subject to our law. It may be seized. Any
party interested in the United States could be made a party. 21 CONG. REC.
2460-61 (1890).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
6213 U.S. 347 (1909).
7 In this case, the defendant was in control of the industry, and had been for some
years. The plaintiff had acquired another firm which had initiated a similar business
in Panama (then part of Colombia) in 1904. The case arose when Costa Rican sol-
diers seized possession of American Banana's plant, allegedly on the instigation of the
defendant, United Fruit Co. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant had a
monopoly, that it had instigated the seizure to maintain its monopoly, and that the Sher-
man Act applied. The district court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 160
F. 184 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 166 F. 261 (2d Cir. 1908).
8 See generally G. WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (1939);
Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63
YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1954); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws,
69 HARV. L. REv. 1452, 1453 (1956).
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the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of na-
tions, which the other state concerned justly might resent.9
In response to the Supreme Court's strict adherence to the statu-
tory directive that United States commerce be kept free from re-
straints,1" the lower courts developed the concept that for the Sher-
man Act to apply, at least some act or event - whether the actor
was an alien or a national - must have occurred within the terri-
tory of the United States." From this evolved the modern import/
export test, which required a showing that the activity had an "ef-
fect" on American commerce.' 2 However, slight effect was not suf-
ficient to allow an exercise of jurisdiction; the effect had to be sub-
stantial and there must have been extensive American participation.
A foreign firm whose conduct had been consummated wholly out-
9 213 U.S. at 356. See also Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sher-
man Act, 70 DICK. L. REV. 187, 188 (1966).
10 The general rule as to jurisdiction and contracts affecting American foreign com-
merce was stated in United States v. Hamburg - Amerikanische P.F.A. Gesellschaft,
200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 216 F. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd on grounds of moot-
ness, 239 U.S. 466 (1916):
• we see nothing to warrant the contention that the acts should be narrowly
interpreted as prohibiting contracts which are performed wholly within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States ....
As the contract directly and materially affects the foreign commerce in
this country by being put into effect here, it is immaterial where it is entered
into .... The vital question in all cases is the same: Is the combination to
so operate in this country as to directly and materially affect our foreign com-
merce? 200 F. at 807.
See, e.g., United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512, 517 (1912); United
States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913); Thomsen v.
Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917).
11 Since the American Banana case, most foreign import/export cases have included
allegations of some act within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See United
States v. Pacific Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (combination within
the United States by a national and alien to monopolize domestic and foreign trade
routes); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), modi-
fied and af'd., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (proscribed combination formed in a foreign
country, but put into operation in the United States). Where most or all of the harmful
acts take place outside the United States, the courts have held that the planning of such
activity within the United States is sufficient to bring it within the purview of the Sher-
man Act. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Branch v. F.T.C., 141
F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). Moreover, the courts have applied an "act within the United
States" standard where the actual realization of a conspiracy takes place in the United
States, even though the conspiracy was initiated in a foreign country. Thomsen v. Cay-
ser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). See, e.g., United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesell-
schaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
12 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), modified and
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and af 'd, 341 U.S.
593 (1951); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950).
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side the United States would not be subject to the Sherman Act. 13
The courts then attempted to define "substantial effect." In United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 14 a trade agreement made in Lon-
don between an American and a British corporation that provided
for a division of world markets was held to be invalid because their
"effect" on American commerce was to dominate tobacco trade both
within the United States and in foreign trade. In United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp.,15 virtually all sisal imported into the United States
had to come through a combination formed between Sisal Sales, an
American corporation and a Mexican corporation; the defendant had
eliminated all competition and had become the exclusive world dis-
tributor of the product. The agreement itself had been made with-
in the United States,16 and the Supreme Court, in reversing the dis-
trict court, held that the defendants were within the Sherman Act's
jurisdiction.
II. THE ALCOA DOCTRINE
The case which determined the present scope of the extraterri-
torial application of the antitrust laws was United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America.17 In this case Aluminum Ltd., a Canadian
corporation, entered into agreements with French, German, Swiss,
and British corporations to form an international cartel known as
Alliance. Defendant Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) was
found to be in violation of the Sherman Act,' although it was not a
party to the agreement. The lower court found that the same per-
sons who held a majority interest in Alcoa's common stock also held
a majority of Aluminum Ltd.1" Because of this relationship with
Alcoa, which controlled 90 percent of the domestic production of
aluminum, the cartel was deemed to have a substantial impact on
American commerce. Even though the court of appeals recognized
that almost any change in the supply of goods in Europe would have
an effect on United States imports and exports, it was still question-
able whether the Sherman Act itself had been violated. Judge
13 Beausang, supra note 9, at 190. See also note 11 supra.
14221 U.S. 106 (1911).
15 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
16 Id. at 274. For a discussion of these earlier cases, see Donovan, Antitrust Con-
siderations in the Organization and Operation of American Business Abroad, 9 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 239, 245 (1968). See also Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66
(1917).
17 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
38Id. at 432.
1)Id. at 441.
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Learned Hand presented two situations: (1) an agreement made
abroad which is not intended to affect our foreign commerce, but
which does in fact affect it; and (2) an agreement which is intended
to affect our foreign commerce, but fails to do so. In the first situ-
ation, the international ramifications of an American court's attempt
to hold these agreements unlawful would be such that it can be as-
sumed that Congress did not wish to include them within the scope
of the Sherman Act. For much the same reason the second situa-
tion would not fall within the scope of the Act, yet where both in-
tent and effect are joined, such conduct comes within the principles
outlined in earlier decisions.20 Judge Hand reasoned that since the
agreements would be unlawful if made in the United States, they
necessarily fell within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, and were
unlawful because of the merged intent and effect.2 Since Alumi-
num Ltd. was a party to this agreement, it was enjoined from par-
ticipating in the agreement and the cartel.
Thus, the doctrine arose from Alcoa that liability could attach,
even to nonnationals, if the acts done outside the United States were
intended to and did produce consequences within. It should be
emphasized, however, that some American participation is needed.22
An agreement solely among foreign corporations would not justify
an assertion of jurisdiction by an American court.23 In the cases
following Alcoa, it became apparent that jurisdiction could be exer-
cised over almost any type of American business abroad. 24 Although
20 Id. at 443, citing United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S.
87 (1913); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927).
21 148 F.2d at 444.
22 Donovan, supra note 16, at 245.
Yet it is most unlikely that any United States court would exercise jurisdiction
over these foreign companies, if they are entirely owned by foreigners and
have performed all their actions in foreign countries without conspiring with
any American nationals. Some additional territorial nexus connecting the for-
eign actors with the United States seems necessary before an American court
will exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals. Id. at 248.
23 Also, neither intent to affect nor consequences on American commerce alone are
enough. Id. at 247-48. Note that in Alcoa Judge Hand ruled that, once intent to af-
fect imports was shown, the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant. 148 F.2d
at 444. See Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving American
and Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws - Part I, 39 S. CAL.
L. REv. 526, 533 (1966).
24American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (conspiracy
formed in the United States which restrained imports to the United States); Thomsen
v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917), and United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation
Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (involving foreign participation in a conspiracy formed in a
foreign country to control shipping between a foreign port and the United States);
Unite States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (conspiracy formed in the United
[Vol. 1: 132
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the statute includes "foreign commerce,""5 the courts have pro-
pounded various standards to circumscribe its extraterritorial scope.
Most cases have dealt with situations in which the prohibited re-
straint or monopoly affected goods imported to or exported from
the United States.2" These cases have tended to delimit the extra-
territorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.27
As the "effect" standard in the import/export cases evolved, a
distinction was drawn between the quantum of proof necessary to
confer jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, and the quantum of
proof necessary to establish a substantive violation of the Act. After
initially requiring a substantial effect upon American foreign com-
merce in order for a court to assert jurisdiction, the contemporary
position of the courts in the import/export cases appears to be that
a "slight" effect on American foreign commerce will support juris-
diction to inquire whether there is enough evidence of "substantial
effect" to prove that a substantive violation has taken place. 8
States but effectuated by obtaining discriminatory foreign legislation which restricted
American foreign commerce); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945) (involving domestic monopoly, foreign cartel agreements, and
common ownership of domestic and foreign subsidiaries); United States v. National
Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), modified and aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947)
(division of the markets and patent pooling arrangement between American corporation
and its foreign competitor held illegal); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F.
Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1953) (holding that competition in American market was "delete-
riously affected" by foreign agreements made overseas in which American companies
participated through domestic and foreign subsidiaries); United States v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and af!'d, 341 U.S. 593
(1951) (holding cartel agreement between American corporation and its chief foreign
competitor to be a violation since it limited their competition inter se in the United
States and in world markets); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100
F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (agreements involving patents and several jointly
owned companies abroad held invalid); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (court issued injunction and directed return
of patents and divestiture of jointly owned companies).
25 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
26 See cases cited in note 24 supra.
2 7 1n United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Hand held that sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act attached liability to wholly
foreign activities that were intended to affect, and did affect imports and exports of the
United States. In order for a violation of the law to be found, such actions had to have
a "direct and substantial effect."
The Attorney General Report of 1955 sought expanded jurisdiction:
[Ilt seems clear that the Sherman Act may apply, not only to conduct in this
country, but also to acts abroad, performed by American firms acting alone or
in concert with foreign firms with such substantial affects upon American
foreign commerce as to amount to unreasonable restraining attempts to monop-
olize, or monopolization. Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 70
(1955).
2RSee, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949),
1969]
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In recent cases, the necessary intent element of Alcoa has been
presumed; 29 if the activity in question has any effect on imports or
exports, the court will assert jurisdiction."0 If the effect on com-
merce is then found to be "direct" and "substantial" there may be
an antitrust violation. The foreign corporation which is participat-
ing in the activity with the American corporation may be held lia-
ble;" if it is not liable under the Sherman Act, the foreign corpora-
tion will be affected in so far as the American corporation has been
enjoined from performing under their agreement or from participat-
ing in the venture.32
III. THE RECENT PACIFIC SEAFARERS CASE
A recent case focusing on the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act is Pacific Seafarers Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line Inc."3
This case concerned a conspiracy between two shipping conferences
to monopolize trade between two foreign ports; neither importation
to nor exportation from the United States was directly involved.34
modified, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953). See also Note, Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the Reach of the Substantive Law Under the
Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1030 (1967).
29 United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified,
115 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1953). For a critical discussion, see K. BREWSTER, ANTI-
TRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 301 (1958).
3 0 See note 12 supra.
31 United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (1929); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v.
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950). The Supreme
Court has held for some time that, with respect to service of process, due process requires
only that for a person to be found within a particular jurisdiction, he must have certain
minimum contacts with it. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
32 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
33404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 872 (1969).
34 South Vietnamese importers were loaned money on the condition that at least
50 percent of any foreign goods financed with such money had to be transported by
American-flag ships. Plaintiffs and defendants were American shipping companies
competing for business, under an American sponsored Agency for International Devel-
opment (A.I.D.) program, of carrying fertilizer and cement from Taiwan and Thailand
to South Vietnam. The lower court held that while the defendants attempted to secure
this trade by lowering their prices pursuant to concerted action and by doing so forced
the plaintiffs out of business, damages could not be awarded since the Sherman Act did
not cover such foreign conduct. Thus, the court of appeals was confronted with the
question of whether this conspiracy by American nationals was a "restraint of trade or
commerce . . . with foreign nations," even though the activity involved the shipment
of foreign goods between foreign ports. The court held that, because the restraints oc-
curred in a market dominated by Americans and because that market was solely a crea-
ture of American foreign policy, there was a sufficient nexus between the parties and
their practices and the United States as to fall within the jurisdictional embrace of the
Sherman Act.
[Vol. 1: 132
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The court of appeals, in reversing the lower court, held that the ap-
pellants were engaged in foreign commerce within the meaning of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The rule to be derived from the de-
cision is that the Sherman Act regulates the economic activity of
Americans even though the relevant market is not within United
States territory and does not involve the exporting or importing of
goods across American borders,3 5 provided: such competing activity
is proscribed by the Act, occurs within a "dominant American mar-
ket,""6 and has a direct and substantial effect on American foreign
commerce.
37
Prior to the Seafarers decision, the Sherman Act had been ap-
plied only to conduct within or without the United States which
affected the exportation from or importation of goods to the United
States. 8  When Seafarers' factual situation arose the old rationale
was inapplicable; an exercise of jurisdiction required a new basis. As
the Seafarers court stated: "fS]urely the test which determines
whether the United States law is applicable must focus on the nexus
between the parties and their practices and the United States, not on
the mechanical circumstances of effect on commodity exports or im-
ports."39
3 Because Seafarers is the first case to directly question the scope of the Sherman
Act where import and exports were not involved, the court of appeals had several op-
tions. It could have completely refused to extend jurisdiction to the case and avoid the
question completely by deciding the case on a substituted ground, or super-imposed the
rulings of the import/export cases to this situation. The fact that the court consciously
overlooked such options would suggest a desire to scrutinize the new problem.
3 It appears that the court recognized that there must be some concrete nexus to
replace the clear bond to the American economy that the import/export requirement
manifestly provided. 404 F.2d at 816.
37 Id. It is questionable what the outcome would have been if one of the defend-
ants had been a foreign shipping line, or if A.I.D. had not been connected with the
matter. The opinion suggests that A.I.D. was not a mere incident to the matter, but
that it provided "a stimulus." See note 34 supra.
8 8 See cases cited in note 12 supra.
39404 F.2d at 815. However, it could be argued that Seafarers does not represent
an actual expansion of the extraterritorial scope of the antitrust laws because of the
unique fact pattern presented. These unique circumstances include: (1) the contested
shipping market was a product of American governmental action; (2) the A.I.D. regu-
lation compelled American flagship participation; (3) the A.I.D. regulation was an
attempt to effectuate American foreign policy; (4) all parties before the court were
American nationals; and (5) the actual conspiracy was agreed upon at a meeting by the
parties in the United States.
A good argument can be made that the nexus provided by the import and export of
goods was not really necessary in Seafarers because of its distinguishable facts. It would
seem inconsistent for several American-flag shipping lines to exclude the plaintiffs, also
American shipping lines, from participation in business sponsored by a governmental
agency, and then for a court to uphold those acts. Also, the dangers to be avoided be-
cause of the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws were greatly reduced where
19691
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Recognizing that the Sherman Act's jurisdiction is greater be-
cause of the new rationale, two conclusions can be drawn. While
the particular facts of Seafarers were conclusive to an exercise of
jurisdiction, several policy considerations suggest that in the future
a more expansive standard is likely. A primary concern for con-
sideration in assessing the direction of the import/export cases is the
contemporary international investment practices. While recent cases
suggest that investments or acquisitions abroad would violate the
antitrust laws only if there were an actual or potential competitor
who is likely to be injured,40 it is questionable whether the same
limited interpretation will continue. Impetus for an expansive read-
ing of the foreign commerce clause of the Sherman Act is likely to
flow from the increasing balance of payments problem.
Since World War II the American investor has pursued new
markets in international trade with increased vigor. Besides West-
ern Europe, the Latin American and Asian markets have increasing-
ly attracted the American investor in the 1960's. However, the
means required to exploit such markets has changed. While goods
could formerly be exported from the United States at a profit, it is
now economically imperative for the American investor to establish
production facilities abroad to capitalize on the benefits of cheaper
foreign labor and raw materials. Neither the courts, nor the execu-
tive or legislative branches of the government are insensitive to the
fact that the acceleration of American investment abroad continues
the only interests affected were American. These litigants were all American shipping
firms and there was no property to be affected in any foreign country by a court decree,
nor was there a right granted to a foreign national which would be abridged. Moreover,
it might be argued that the court took notice of the fact that the price-cutting agreement
was made in the United States. These facts were the same as those which concerned the
court in Alcoa. However, it might also be argued that the court's indirect refusal to
apply the "act within the United States" standard and avoidance of alternative grounds
indicates it inherently rejected the "effect" test then used, and required not only a sub-
stantial effect upon American commerce, but also restraints in a dominantly American
market.
40See United States v. J. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1965),
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966), which substantiates that mergers involving a
foreign participant which affect domestic competition will be judged under section 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1954), on the same basis as domestic mergers.
Schlitz, a major beer producer in the local market, had obtained a controlling interest
in Labatt, a Candian producer, which in turn controlled General, a domestic producer
that ranked near the top in three relevant market areas. The court found that while
Labatt was not presently a competitor in the United States, it "had the desire, the intent,
and the resourcefulness to enter the United States markets and to make General a stronger
competitor in those markets." The acquisition had resulted in a "substantial lessening
of actual and potential competition" in the United States in violation of section 7. Id.
at 147. It is not clear whether the court treated this as an import/export case, but it
would appear that it did not. See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
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to be a primary source of the mounting balance of payments prob-
lem.41 However, while some authorities have argued that the extra-
territorial application of the antitrust laws, since Alcoa, has had a
deterrent effect upon both American investment and business activ-
ity abroad,42 others have come to the opposite conclusion.43
A second policy consideration that would support a further ex-
tension of Sherman Act jurisdiction is the underlying feeling that
unless the United States supervises the conduct of its nationals carry-
ing on business in foreign countries, no government will."
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are two general principles of jurisdictional sovereignty5
which are relevant to the extraterritorial application of American
41 See Celler, A View of the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 3, 7
(1965). See generally Comment, Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: The EHfectu-
ating Calculus, 1 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 45 (1968).
42 Linowitz, Antitrust Laws: A Damper on American Foreign Trade? 44 A.B.A.J.
853 (1958); see Donovan, supra note 16, at 249 n.24.
43 Fugate, Damper or Bellows? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade, 45 A.B.A.J. 947
(1959). See Brewster, Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: "An Ap-
praisal," 11 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 65 (1957); Donovan, supra note 16, at 249
n.25.
44 But note also the argument that since Western European industrial nations are
small in comparison to the United States, "[t~he main concern of Western European
economists and others has not been whether there shall be restrictive practices and mo-
nopolies but rather whether each particular practice is good or bad for the nation as a
whole. On the other hand the United States view is that relatively untrettered competi-
tion is indispensible to regulate economic perference." Snyder, Foreign Investment and
Trade: Extraterritorial Impact of United States Antitrust Law, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 7
(1965). The same is true in the merger where European laws are willing to tolerate
restraints on competition provided they will nurture their incubating markets. As the
international monetary problem grows more acute, it appears that the divergent aims
of American and foreign laws will become more accentuated. The antitrust laws must
be able to reach the foreign operations of American business as well as the domestic
if the purpose of the antitrust laws is to be accomplished. Id. at 10. See also Donovan,
supra note 23, at 527.
45 Jurisdiction, in a broad sense, is the power of a state to affect legal relationships.
In international law it means the power to "create interests" which will be recognized
by other states as valid. The world community is composed of states, all having equal
rights with respect to each other. Thus, every state is free to exercise its power as it
deems necessary and proper within its own territory, with a few exceptions. The juris-
diction of a state is derived from its sovereignty. Within its territory it can legislate in
the area of personal and property rights or create whatever criminal responsibilities it
deems necessary. Generally, the jurisdiction of a state is confined to its own territory
and has no effect outside it. If it undertakes an exercise of jurisdiction outside its own
territory, which is not permitted by the law of nations, the foreign courts may treat it as
null and void. However, in certain circumstances a state may punish offenses or affect
the rights and duties of its own nationals where ever they may be. WHEATON, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 269 (6th ed. 1929). See also, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §
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antitrust law: the territorial and the objective application princi-
ples.46  The territorial principle is derived from the concept that,
given the equal sovereignty of states, their jurisdictions are mutually
exclusive and therefore each is limited to its own territory.47  The
territorial principle is the basis for all legislation and jurisdiction
within a state;48 however, the courts have applied the antitrust laws
to persons, acts, and property outside the United States. Concurrent
jurisdiction by two states over persons, property, or acts in one of
them is exactly the situation which the territorial principle seeks to
avoid. Generally, a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over property
in another state;49 an order of an American court to dispose of prop-
erty or to refrain from performing a contract or an act which is valid
under the laws of the locus state would be a violation of the terri-
198 (1906); Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241, 252
(1923); Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 569, 574 (1954). It is
generally accepted that a state's jurisdiction may extend beyond its own territory to its
own nationals, but this power is usually limited to criminal acts. Haight, International
Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954).
Moreover, it is secondary to the jurisdiction of the state in whose territory the person is
located at the time. See Beale supra, at 253.
46 Besides the territorial principle and the objective application principle, which are
discussed in the text, there are also the protective principle and the universality prin-
ciple. The protective principle says that a state may legislate or act with respect to
conduct outside it which affects its "integrity, interests, or independence." See Article
7 of Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Suspp.
435, 543 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention); Oliver, Does International
Law Keep the Sherman Act at Home?, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 326, 330 n.9 (1958). One writer
has suggested that the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in Alcoa was based
upon the protective principle. Raymond, A New Look At The Jurisdiction In Alcoa,
61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558, 568 n.21 (1967). The United States could not use the pro-
tective principle because of the difficulty in justifying such antitrust acts as being of-
fenses against the integrity, security, and independence of the United States. Note also
that Article 7 of the Draft Convention found it necessary to include a limitation that
the "Article excludes any act which is a guaranteed liberty of the alien in the State in
which the act was committed." Thus, prosecutions on the basis of the protective prin-
ciple for antitrust violations by an alien whose state allows the act or agreement in ques-
tion seem to have no basis under international law. Draft Convention supra, at 557.
The protective principle is applied to nationals in the United States and Great Britain.
See Haight, supra note 45, at 640. Some nations also apply it to aliens as well. See
Draft Convention supra, at 547.
In contrast, the universality principle states that a state has jurisdiction to punish
certain crimes such as piracy which historically have been regarded as crimes against
the law of nations, even though committed outside the territorrial limits of the state.
The universality principle has also been applied to certain other crimes. See Draft Con-
vention supra, at Articles 9 and 10.
47 2 MOORE, supra note 45, at § 197; Beale, supra note 45, at 253.
48 2 MOORE, supra note 45, at § 197, citing The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362 (1824).
49 2 MOORE, supra note 45, at § 198, citing Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 240
(1808). For a short discussion of territorial jurisdiction, see Beale, supra note 45, at
252.
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torial principle." The objective application principle provides an
exception to the territorial principle. It rests upon the well known
concept that if a person initiates an act outside a territory, but that
act is consummated or takes effect within it, he may be answerable
where the wrongful act was actually consummated."
Considerable attention has been given to the use of these prin-
ciples of jurisdiction for purposes of validating the extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws. One commentator, who con-
siders the objective application principle to be a justification for the
extraterritorial extension of American antitrust laws, has concluded
that this principle was not intended to apply to antitrust laws at
all.5" The case of The S.S. "Lotus,"" perhaps the best enunciation
of the objective application principle, states that it is applicable only
when the "effect or consummation is inseparable from the act" done
outside the state. 4
There are at least four arguments against employing the ob-
jective application principle as a justification for the extraterritorial
application of the American antitrust laws. First, it has been argued
that Sherman Act violations are not "crimes" which are recognized
as such by other nations, but rather, they constitute a special genus
created by Congress."5 Second, there is a readily recognizable rela-
50 2 MOORE, supra note 45, at §§ 175, 198; Haight, supra note 45, at 641.
11 2 MOORE, supra note 45, at § 202; Carlston, supra note 45, at 579; Oliver, supra
note 46, at 330. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
The objective application principle was used to justify the decision in Alcoa. See
Raymond, supra note 46, at 560-62. The author states that the rationale of Alcoa was
adopted by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 (1965). See also Raymond supra, at 568 n.21.
52 Haight, supra note 46, at 639.
53 Case of The S.S. "Lotus," [1927) P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 9. The case involved a
collision on the high seas between a French-flag vessel and a Turkish vessel in which
the latter was sunk with the loss of eight persons. The French officer on duty at the
time of the collision was prosecuted and convicted in a Turkish court for involuntary
manslaughter. The issue before the Permanent Court of International Justice was
whether the Turkish authorities had jurisdiction to bring criminal proceedings against
him. The court held that there was no rule of international law which said that such
proceedings were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state of registry of the vessel.
54 On these points the court, directing itself to the facts of the case before it ex-
plained the holding of the case:
The offense for which Lieutenant Demons appears to have been prosecuted
was an act - of negligence or imprudence - having its origin on board the
Lotus, whilst its effects made themselves felt on board the Boz-Kourt. These
two elements are, legally, entirely inseparable, so much so that their separation
renders the offence non-existent. Id. at 30.
55 In England, for example, a restraint of trade made in good faith and for a valid
interest may be lawful even though it may work a harm on another person. See Mogul
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 21 Q.B.D. 544, 553 (1888). The de-
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tion between cause and effect in cases of, objective application which
is not usually apparent in antitrust litigation.56 A classic example
of the objective application principle is where X in State A shoots
across the border at Y in State B. The cause (the shooting) has a
direct and proximate relation to the effect (Y falling dead). Con-
trast this with an agreement made in London by British, French, and
American firms whereby the American firm is to be the sole sup-
plier, and the two European firms, the sole distributors of a certain
type of heavy machine. In this kind of situation it is difficult to
measure accurately the relationship between the agreement and any
economic effect on American commerce. It can also be argued that
the offenses under the American antitrust laws should not be in-
cluded in offenses under the objective application principle because
of the vague delineation of antitrust limitations.5" Finally, if the
objective application principle is applied to the antitrust laws, the
freedom granted by foreign governments to their corporations
would be abridged and the results might well be chaotic.58
It has been suggested that there is a difference between an effect
of an act done abroad which is "inseparable" from the act, and acts
done abroad which are lawful where they occur, producing no more
than an economic effect in another state. With regard to the latter
case, there is no justification under international law for the of-
fendants were a group of shipowners who had a monopoly of shipping between Europe
and China. This association made an agreement with exporters in China that if they
shipped their tea on association vessels exclusively, they would get a 5 percent rebate.
The court held that since the monopoly did not have malicious intent to ruin the plain-
tiffs, no action could be brought for conspiracy. See also Attorney General of the Com-
monwealth of Australia v. The Adelaid Steamship Co., [1913] A.C. 781, where the
court, in interpreting the Australian Industries Preservation Act of 1906, held that af-
though an agreement was in restraint of trade, one could not from that fact alone pre-
sume public detriment. See Haight, supra note 45, at 648.
56 Id. at 648.
57 Id. at 649.
58 The extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws by the American courts has
been criticized abroad as well. In British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries Ltd., [1955] 1 Ch. 37 (1954), the court granted an injunction restraining the
defendant from reassigning a patent in obedience to a United States court order. The
English court held that the assignment to Imperial Chemical vested the plaintiff with a
property right which the United States district court could not take away. The district
court lacked jurisdiction to affect any property rights in the plaintiff. In United States
v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 5 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 5 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the Swiss
government protested the application of American antitrust laws to contracts between
Swiss corporations and foreign corporations. See generally Note, Exterterritorial Ap-
plication of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259, 269
(1960).
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fended state to punish the actors. 9 The former situation, however,
is widely recognized in international law. 60 Professor Brierly has
analyzed this on the basis of what he calls "constructive presence"
of the offender in the place of the effect.6 The consummation of
the act has the effect of making the person "present." Brierly was
careful, however, to stress that there be a direct relationship between
cause and effectY
In view of the scope of the application of the antitrust laws and
the conflict with both international law and the municipal law of
foreign states, consideration should be given to possible solutions to
the conflict.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
It might be argued that, in view of the pervasiveness of Ameri-
can business abroad, the purposes of the antitrust laws could not be
fulfilled unless they were given a broad interpretation. While the
present interpretation of the Sherman Act includes nearly all Ameri-
can business activity abroad, it often conflicts with the laws of other
nations and with general principles of international law .: A num-
ber of possible solutions have been suggested to resolve this conflict;
these fall into three general categories: adherence to a basically ter-
ritorial principle, a modified objective application, and a treaties ap-
proach.
At least one commentator has suggested that the United States
must reassess its position and return to the territorial principle which
was applied in the American Banana case."' The problem presented
through the use of this solution is that a corporation having subsidi-
aries in the United States and abroad and a strong position with
respect to a certain commodity could quite conceivably exclude any
other American firm from participation in the relevant foreign mar-
ket for that commodity. This position is clearly inconsistent with
59 G. HAIGHT, THE SHERMAN ACT, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LEGAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 102 (1962).
60 2 MOORE, supra note 45, at § 202.
61 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 301 (6th ed. 1963):
It now appears to be universally admitted that when a crime is committed in
the territorial jurisdiction of one state as the direct result of the act of a per-
son at the time corporally present in another state, international law by reason
of the principle of constructive presence of the offender at the place where his
act took effect, does not forbid prosecution of the offender by the former state,
should he come within its territroial jurisdiction. Id., citing the Lotus case.
62 Id.
63 See notes 44 & 58 supra; Haight, supra note 45, at 653.
64 Haight, supra note 45, at 653.
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present antitrust policy and has been rejected, as evidenced by the
cases.
65
Another commentator has suggested the adoption of what he
terms a modified objective application principle.66 Essentially, the
courts would adhere to a territorial principle; however, in the few
cases in which decrees would issue to foreign corporations, jurisdic-
tion would be retained for a time with leave to return to the court
for modification of the decree if the corporation is faced with crimi-
nal liabilities under its own state's law, or if it would be in breach
of another contract or agreement as a result of the American court's
decree. This solution may not provide sufficient latitude for ef-
fective regulation of American business, not only because it would
limit the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, but also in
as much as the Justice Department has found that it is often neces-
sary to include a foreign corporation in order to effectuate the pur-
pose of the antitrust laws.67 Also, this solution does not answer the
multitude of antitrust problems inherent when an American sub-
sidiary is actually incorporated in a foreign country. Even if con-
sidered an American corporation from the point of view of the
United States, the foreign country can justly complain about an
American court's exercise of jurisdiction over one of its own corpo-
rations; if considered as a foreign corporation, then the antitrust
laws would really be confined to the territorial limits of the United
States, with a few exceptions.
A number of suggestions have been made which are essentially
modifications of the objective application principle. It has been
suggested that the courts distinguish between "positive and negative
effects" on American foreign commerce.68 This theory, closely fol-
lowing the strict objective application principle, draws a distinction
between the positive effect caused as a result of a direct action and
a negative effect caused as a result of a contract or an agreement to
restrict the flow of goods to a country. International law recognizes
a duty not to perform acts abroad which have direct and deleterious
consequences within a country.69 However, since there is no legal
duty to send goods into a country, one cannot be held liable for an
65 For a comprehensive discussion of the case law development, see Donovan, supra
note 16, at 242-54.
66 Oliver, supra note 46, at 333.
67 Carlston, Foreign Economic Policy and the Antitrust Laws, 40 MINN. L. REV.
125, 138 (1956), citing ATT'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 76 (1955).
68 Raymond, supra note 46, at 567.
69 See note 46 supra; Harvard Research, supra note 46, at 487.
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agreement which restricts the flow of those goods. Obviously, un-
der this theory Alcoa would have come out differently. One of the
major difficulties of this theory is that if there are no distinctions
drawn among types of negative effects, the effect might be to lend
validity to such behavior as boycotts."r Also, the theory appears to
ignore the fundamental difference between a unilateral or collective
decision not to export to or import from a particular nation, which
is not intended to affect that state's foreign commerce, and an agree-
ment which from its inception is intended to restrict imports or ex-
ports in order to achieve some further economic purpose, such as in-
flation of prices or elimination of competition. This theory would
also seem to argue that most cases since Alcoa should have come out
the other way, which is contrary both to the trend and the policies
of the antitrust application.
It has been suggested that the courts distinguish between "trade
among the several states" and "trade with foreign nations,"'" since
the language of the statute draws the same distinction. 2  It is
argued that trade with foreign nations implies less restraint as op-
posed to trade among our own states, which all operate under the
same antitrust laws." The courts have not accepted this theory.
Moreover, the conflicts problem would be no closer to solution.
Still another commentator has proposed a solution which follows
the idea of notice. Before the court can exercise jurisdiction, the
foreign corporation acting abroad must be sufficiently aware that
its acts will have "direct and substantial consequences" in another
country so that it can reasonably be said that it was "put on notice"
with respect to that country's law.74  The problem which could arise
under this theory is that the courts might presume knowledge of the
effects. Moreover, in all of these suggestions, the courts would be
required to narrow the present extraterritorial scope of the Act, thus
leaving American business abroad with a level of freedom which has
70 Comment, The "Effects" Doctrine of Jurisdiction, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1015, 1017
(1967).
71 Whitney, supra note 8.
72 Sherman § 1 reads: "Every contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is declared to be
illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) (emphasis added).
73 Whimey, supra note 8, at 660. However, one is still presented with the problem
of whether the courts will accept this reasoning. They have not thus far, and it seems
that the extraterritorial scope of the antitrust laws is expanding, not contracting. See,
e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 872 (1969).
74 Carlston, supra note 45, at 582.
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been considered to be undesirable.75 Also, only the first of these
suggestions, that of a return to the strict territorial principle, clearly
solves the conflicts problem. The others, with the possible excep-
tion of the "positive/negative effect" theory, still contemplate the
exercise of jurisdiction by an American court over persons and prop-
erty located in other nations. At present the courts are faced with
the dilemma of how to effectively apply the antitrust laws to Ameri-
can foreign enterprises in order to achieve the purposes of those
laws and the policies of the United States, and at the same time, ob-
serve the rights of others, derived from the laws of other nations
and from traditional concepts of international law.
In order to preserve the rights of others under international and
municipal law, while still effectuating the purposes of the American
antitrust laws, the United States might consider multilateral or bi-
lateral treaties as a third possible approach. This approach obviates
the problem of conflicts due to unilateral action on the part of the
United States. First, both or all parties to a treaty generally agree
on the action to be taken; second, a treaty can be drafted in such a
way that it will preserve the interests of all signing parties. Thus
far little progress has been achieved with bilateral treaties.7 6  In-
deed, the bilateral treaty approach may not be an efficacious one be-
cause, although a particular matter is settled between the two sign-
ing parties, it is still open to debate among the rest of the world
community. Conceivably this situation could become intolerably
confusing to businessmen and counsel if all or some of these bi-
lateral treaties had significantly different provisions.
Probably the best and most enduring solution would be a multi-
lateral treaty including all of the major industrial and commercial
nations of the world. This might be done through the machinery
of some existing international institution, such as the United Na-
tions.77  Some of the points it might cover are the types of activities
75 See note 44 supra.
76 The treaty which comes closest to this point is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation, with the Italian Republic Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949); T.I.A.S.
No. 1965 (effective July 26, 1949). Article XVIII, paragraph 3, of this Treaty states:
The two High Contracting Parties agree that business practices which restrain
competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic control, and which
are engaged in or made effective by one or more private or public commercial
enterprises or by combination, agreement or other arrangement among public
or private commercial enterprises may have harmful effects upon the com-
merce between their respective territories. Accordingly, each High Contract-
ing Party agrees upon the request of the other High Contracting Party to
consult with respect to any such practices and to take such measures as it deems
appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects.
77 For an example of an earlier proposal of such a multilateral treaty, see Draft Ar-
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to be proscribed, the extent to which the corporation's or national's
own government could enforce the treaty or national laws, and the
effect which. government authorization would have with respect to
the validity of the acts concerned. A multilateral treaty would have
the advantage of uniformity. Consideration might be given to the
creation of a commission which could give rulings on matters in
doubt or dispute.
International law has recognized the territorial and objective ap-
plication principles of jurisdiction for centuries; in the past they have
worked quite well. However, antitrust problems cannot be boiled
down into one neat solution. International law and the world have
never before been faced with international commerce of this scale.
Traditional principles of international law are not sufficiently adapt-
able to meet the pressing needs of the new types of business organi-
zations which exist today. The American antitrust laws are far dif-
ferent from earlier laws in two respects: first, because of the world-
wide business activity of American enterprises; second, the Ameri-
can antitrust laws are more strict than most others, especially the
European. Any solution which is suggested must take into account
the trend of the cases, the plausibility of the solution, and whether
the approach will preserve the interests not only of the United
States, but of the rest of the world as well.
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ticles of Agreement in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business
Practices, 16 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 11, at 12; U.N. Doc. E/2380 (1953). See also
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